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1ABSTRACT
This paper highlights why financial bailouts are an inevitable and necessary element 
in global efforts aimed at ensuring that financial stability is sustained. How could such 
bailouts  be  conducted  in  such  a  way  that  moral  hazard  does  not  become  a  too 
frequent, ever recurring issue?
Systemic  risks  constitute  a  crucial  reason for  the need to  avoid  global  instability. 
Adequately and promptly responding to “too big to fail” institutions and nations also 
constitutes  a  crucial  component  of  the  need  to  avoid  and  contain  the  spread  of 
systemic risks.
Key  Words:  systemic  risks,  financial  regulation,  sovereign  debts,  bailouts,  moral 
hazard, supervision, monetary, fiscal policies, IMF, monetary unions, regional unions 
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A. Introduction
Whilst  mutual  respect  is  certainly  a  pre  requisite  and  necessary  foundation  for  a 
successful and lasting relationship, an even more vital bedrock can be evidenced and 
illustrated  through mutual  dependency  and  respect.   In  further  illustrating  such  a 
point, the reasons behind the European Central Bank (ECB)’s willingness and efforts 
in providing Longer Term Refinancing Operations,  as well  as facilitating bailouts, 
could be justified as well as questioned. Furthermore, its patience in the provision of 
such facilities, in the earnest expectation that those countries most affected by the 
Euro sovereign debt crisis, would optimise the opportunity and time provided by the 
supply  of  liquidity  support,  is  not  only  indicative  of  some  element  of  trust  and 
confidence  reposed  in  such  countries,  but  is  also  considered  to  be  a  way  of 
encouraging countries who are most severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis to 
increase their maximisation potential in respect of the level of returns to be expected 
from reposing trust and funding in these countries. 
Why Should (and why does) the ECB Count On Countries Worst Hit By the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis?
The reason why the ECB should expect and hope for positive results in return for its  
efforts in purchasing bonds and providing liquidity assistance to countries such as 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, can be linked to the importance of such countries 
in its policy and decision making processes.
1  Covenant University, Canaanland.
3“The ECB has purchased bonds issued by euro zone governments in recent years, to 
try to support demand for the debt, as well as drive down yields, which move in the 
opposite direction to bond prices. Even though the effectiveness of such bond buying, 
known as the ECB’s Securities Market Programme has been criticised by many policy 
makers  who regard  it  as  parallel  to  central  bank financing  for  governments  –  an 
activity which the ECB is prohibited from providing, it is also highlighted that there is 
expectation from the markets that the government should use the time bought by the 
liquidity to deliver.”2
The dependency of the ECB on countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
can be considered to be greater than that of the International Monetary Fund (and also 
in respect of those other countries whose purposes it serves), from the viewpoint of 
regional  association.  Irrespective  of  their  Euro  currency  links,  the  state  of  the 
economies of these countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) affects that of their 
neighbouring  counterparts,  as  well  as  the  ECB’s  policies  and  decision  making 
processes on financial stability measures and systemic risks to a larger extent. This 
leads to the first of the essential components of “the everlasting relationship” of the 
continual supply of liquidity funding and the need for such supply. It will also be 
highlighted later on in the paper that numerous measures aimed at supporting demand 
only serve as temporary measures and that  over reliance on such, may eventually 
result in other crises of their own.
B. Anatomy and Components of an Everlasting Relationship
i) Diversity in a “Not So” Diverse World
Tourism: The local flavour, cuisine, weather conditions and other “exotic” and unique 
elements of certain countries constitute among several reasons why countries such as 
2  J Wilson, “Official at ECB Hints at Fresh Bond Move” 2012 <www.businessdayonline.com>
4Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, top the list as favourites for European holiday 
destinations  (excluding  other  countries  such  as  Egypt,  Cost  Rica,  Kenya,  the 
Bahamas,  Barbados  etc).  With  particular  respect  to  Spain  and  Greece,  this  is  a 
tradition that dates back to as far as the origins of tourism!
In other words diversity attracts – albeit diversity with mutual acceptance and respect 
for each other’s diversity. Whether a return to the currencies assumed by countries 
severely affected the Sovereign Debt Crisis (prior to their usage of the Euro) would 
even  boost  tourism levels  to  greater  levels  (than  is  the  case  at  present)  in  these 
countries, constitutes another topic for discussion.
ii) Common Objectives and a Shared Sense of Purpose
Similar  passions,  common  interests,  sharing  the  same  goals,  visions,  dreams  and 
aspirations, constitutes a second and even deeper element towards the fulfilment of an 
enduring and symbiotic relationship.
iii) Developing  and  Sustaining  a  Deep  Sense  of  Understanding,  Improved 
Communication Over the Years
The  approach  to,  and  success  in  handling  crises  will  depend  on  the  level  of 
understanding – as well as communication which has developed between those parties 
over the years.
Crises – be they financial, sovereign debt related, should ideally, provide a forum or 
fora whereby greater cooperation and collaboration between neighbours and global 
counterparts can be fostered: between financial and other related sectors from which 
such crises emanate. 
5iv) Differences on the One Hand, Similar and Common Goals and Objectives 
on the  Other,  and a  Balancing Reinforcing Complementary  Symbiotic 
Relationship  Which  Not  Only  Generates  Productive  Results,  But  Also 
Brings Out the Best From Parties Involved in the Relationship
“Excessive private or public consumption, or both, usually accompanied and enabled 
by rising debt and inflated asset prices, and a corresponding decline in investment, 
constitute a new set of growth models with built in structural limitations, which has 
recently been discovered by many advanced countries. Such a set of growth models 
appears to work until domestic aggregate demand can no longer sustain growth and 
employment – at which point it ends in either gradual stagnation or a violent financial 
and economic crisis.”3 Furthermore, “the opposite model”, according to Spence, that 
is, “the excessive reliance on investment to generate aggregate demand, is also a self 
limiting growth pattern. When the private and social returns of investment diminish 
too much,  growth cannot  be sustained indefinitely,  even though rising investment 
rates can sustain aggregate demand for a while.”
Is There Always (and Should There Be) a “Constant” Leader in Successful and 
Lasting Relationship?
It  is  clear  that  all  desired  and  required  qualities  for  a  collaboration  and  union 
cannot/should not be supplied from one source. To what degree is the other willing to 
3  M Spence, “Why Do Economies Stop Growing?” Thursday 24 May 2012 
<www.businessdayonline.com>
6accept  and  be  subordinate  to  the  other’s  terms?  Such  leadership  role  should  be 
understood and clearly underlined right from the inception of the relationship between 
both/all the parties. Where there is mutual respect between parties, this should not 
even raise serious issues. There is always an “implied” and clear/natural leader in 
every  successful  relationship  –  one  who  does  not  need  to  be  announced.  The 
chemistry between the parties says it all. However, certain higher profile public and 
global roles call for clear accentuation of leadership responsibilities and roles.
v. Trust
Will/Should the ECB terminate the provision of its facilities where and when it is 
evident that the bailouts which have been provided have proved ineffective or that the 
use of such facilities have been inappropriately/ineffectively used by its recipients? 
This  constitutes  one  of  those  areas  where  the  beauty  of  an  enduring  relationship 
arises. Depending on the relationship and parties involved, to what extent, and should 
terms between certain parties to a contractual relationship be relaxed (at all)?
This is a question which may be best left to the parties (who understand each other 
best)  to  respond  to.  There  are  not  so  permissible  and  irreparable  breaches  of 
contractual terms on the one hand, whilst understandable, pardonable and forgiveable 
acts also exist on the other hand. Where certain parties are so dependent on each other 
in a relationship, it is so difficult or inconceivable to imagine a breach of trust arising 
or occurring (and if it should occur, such strong dependency should outweigh the need 
to penalise each other (or the other party) unduly).
As highlighted in a previous paper, “with respect to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, 
it appears more likely that bailouts will continue to be provided and that sovereign 
debt levels will continue to rise – given tough and austere fiscal measures operating in 
countries who have received bailouts. Given these circumstances, it becomes much 
7easier to appreciate why these countries are likely to default on their sovereign debt 
obligations.”4
In such a case as the above, should the ECB be expected to be more lenient and 
understanding of the tough fiscal conditions encountered by those countries being 
granted bail outs? The response to this would appear to be in the affirmative.
C. Conclusion
Trust  is  an  element  whose  qualities  are  derived  from  the  long  term,  consistent, 
consolidating,  reliable  and enduring nature of the relationship.  Do factors such as 
historical  background,  past  records  and  the  predictability  of  future  events  (based 
solely  on  the  past)  constitute  a  sound  basis  for  developing  (and  encouraging) 
rewarding relationships?
One thing is certain: the world is constantly evolving and there are evident signals to 
corroborate the fact that even past and present alliances are now forming and forging 
productive relationships with new and emerging alliances. The world has moved on! 
(that is, excepting those who choose to continue to dwell in the shadows of the past). 
Whether we rely heavily on, have invested in, or expect great returns from certain 
relationships, the shades from the past should not blind our vision for the present and  
the future.
More importantly,  lessons from the past should serve as a forum for greater unity 
rather than a basis for the reawakening of old wounds. The International Monetary 
Fund serves as a classic reflection of the fact that beautiful and enduring relationships 
do not  have to  restrict  themselves to  just  national  or regional  boundaries.  This  is 
evidenced by its  present  collaboration  with  the  ECB in  the  sovereign  debt  crisis.  
4  For further information on this, see M Ojo, “Bailouts and Longer Term Refinancing 
Operations: When Temporary Cures Generate Longer Term Economic” RePeC and SSRN papers.
8National  and  regions  unions  are  certainly  of  immense  importance  though. 
International unions and collaborations represent a huge step forward in solving crises 
which are increasingly of an international, global and systemic nature. 
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